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ABSTRACT  This study examined the land rights and rental systems followed by sawah rice 
farmers in Nigeria. The study was conducted in six states in Nigeria that use sawah rice tech-
nology: Kwara, Ondo, Niger, Ebonyi, Kaduna, and Abuja, which is the Federal Capital Terri-
tory. A total of 124 sawah farmers were selected for participation based on their involvement 
in sawah-based rice production. Data used in this study were collected from October 2009 to 
January 2011 in all the sawah sites in Nigeria. T-test was used to determine significant differ-
ences in the yields and farm sizes of landlord and tenant farmers. The land tenure system 
practiced in the lowlands is governed primarily by inheritance (71.8%), with temporary ar-
rangements made through rentals (37.1%). Tenants pay ₦12,000 ha-1year-1 in land-for-cash 
agreements and 5% of the total yield of rice in land-for-paddy agreements. Generally, agree-
ments between landlords and tenants are verbal, binding, and honored by both parties. Land 
conflicts occur when either party breaches the agreement and always result in the landlords 
taking over the land. Significant differences in the farm sizes (t = 3.424 P<0.05 = 0.02) and yields 
(t = 3.167 P<0.05 = 0.01) of landlord and tenant farmers were found. The findings of the study 
indicate the importance of secured land tenure, which affects the practice of sawah and the 
productivity of rice farming. Sustaining and improving sawah rice production in the study area 
will require addressing the land tenure issues of both landlords and tenants.
Key Words: Conflict management; Land rental; Land rights; Nigeria; Sawah.
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INTRODUCTION
Due to the diversity of the agro-ecological production systems in Nigeria, the 
food sector of Nigerian agriculture includes a large array of staple crops. Among 
these crops, rice has risen to a position of greatest importance. As far back as 
the mid-1970s, rice consumption in Nigeria was increasing tremendously, at about 
10% per annum, due to changing consumer preferences and increases in the pop-
ulation. Domestic production has never been able to meet the demand, leading 
to considerable imports, which, as of 2011, accounted for about 1,000,000 metric 
tonnes yearly, with Nigeria spending more than US$300 million on rice imports 
annually. The demand for rice has been increasing at a much faster rate in Nige-
ria than in other West African countries since the mid-1970s (Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations—FAO, 2001). According to the FAO (2001), 
Nigeria had the lowest per-capita annual consumption of rice in the sub-region 
(average of 3 kg) during the 1960s. Since then, Nigerian per-capita consumption 
levels have grown significantly, at 7.3% per annum. Consequently, per-capita con-
sumption during the 1980s averaged 18 kg and reached 22 kg in 1995–1999. Aver-
age growth rates in Nigerian per-capita rice consumption are likely to continue for 
years to come.
Rice is cultivated in virtually all the agro-ecological zones in Nigeria. Despite 
this, Nigeria’s rice production capacity is still far below the demand. The aver-
age yield of upland and lowland rain-fed rice in Nigeria is 1.8 ton/ha, whereas 
that of land with irrigation systems is 3.0 ton/ha (PCU, 2002). This is very low 
when compared with 3.0 ton/ha from upland and lowland systems and 7.0 ton/
ha from irrigated land in other countries (WARDA & NISER, 2001). The sawah 
rice production system was introduced to the inland valley of Nigeria to increase 
the yield of rice because it can overcome soil fertility problems through geologi-
cal fertilization processes (Oladele & Wakatsuki, 2008). Sawah refers to a leveled 
rice field surrounded by banks with inlets and outlets for irrigation and drainage. 
The basic elements of the sawah system include improved irrigated rice basins, 
seedbed preparation, transplanting and spacing of seedlings, fertilizer application, 
and, most importantly, water management. According to Nwite et al. (2011), sawah 
lowland farming with small-scale irrigation schemes for integrated watershed man-
agement constitutes the most promising strategy for addressing soil fertility prob-
lems and restoring the degraded watershed in the tropical environment for increased 
and sustainable food production. The sawah system utilizes the inland valleys, 
which are reported to be high in fertility, through appropriate water management. 
According to Nwite et al. (2011), sawah remains the prerequisite technology for 
restoring and conserving the degraded watershed in the tropical environment for 
increased and sustainable food production and ultimately in pursuit of the much-
awaited Green Revolution (GR) in West Africa.
One of the major constraints faced by sawah rice production in Nigeria is the 
problem of land tenure (Oladele & Wakatsuki, 2009). Hart (1982) described the 
land tenure situation in Africa as confusing and conflict-ridden. Constraints relat-
ing to insecure land tenure have continued to discourage Africans from making 
needed agricultural investments (CAPRI, 2005). Secure access and rights to land 
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are fundamental to the achievement of food security and sustainable rural devel-
opment. Insecure and limited access to land has contributed to poverty, which in 
turn has provided the ideal circumstances for conflict (Huggins & Pottierl, 2011). 
Therefore, understanding the dynamics associated with different types of land 
rights and tenure is crucial to any agricultural development effort. Lack of assur-
ance of land rights for a long period of time and unequal land distribution ham-
per agricultural development by limiting land access to many needy Africans, 
relegating them to the status of land tenants and therefore opening the door to 
conflict among people.
For sawah technology to succeed and contribute to the realization of Green Rev-
olution in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and particularly Nigeria, it is essential that 
issues related to the land tenure regime and land rental system are addressed. Land 
for sawah development must be secured for a long period of time to accommodate 
the construction of structures such as bunds, canals, and dykes. Improvement of 
the rice-growing environment through the promotion of lowland sawah technology 
will be a mirage if land tenure, as it relates to the landlord-tenant relationship, is 
not addressed. This requires research to examine land rights, the rental system, land 
conflicts, and conflict-management strategies in Nigeria with a view to improving 
the use of sawah technology in rice production. This study examined the land rights 
regime and land rental system as it relates to the development of sawah technol-
ogy in Nigeria. The specific objectives of the study are to examine: 1) the rental 
system in sawah production areas in Nigeria; 2) the nature of the land rights regime 
among landlords and tenants and the land-related constraints faced by tenants farm-
ers; 3) conflict management in the landlord-tenant relationship as it relates to sawah 
development; and 4) significant differences in farm sizes and the yields of landlord 
and tenant sawah farmers.
LAND RIGHTS REGIME IN NIGERIA
The land tenure system in Nigeria is based on the Land Use Decree (Act) of 
1978, which is used to administer and control land use in the country (Fabiyi, 
1984). The Land Use Decree of 1978 reflects the idea that it is in the public 
interest that the rights of all Nigerians to the land of Nigeria be asserted and 
preserved by law. The objectives of the decree are to facilitate the rapid economic 
and social transformation of the country through a rationalization of land use, to 
enable state governments to bring about proper control and administration of land 
for the benefit of their people, to remove a main cause of social and economic 
inequality, and to provide an incentive to development by providing easy access 
to land for the state and the people. The objectives of the Land Use Decree 
remain largely unfulfilled several years after its enactment, and titles to land 
appear to be more insecure now than ever. Indeed, land is less available to the 
ordinary Nigerian today than it was prior to the Decree, thereby relegating most 
citizens to an inevitable state of perpetual tenancy.
Land regimes are often categorized as communal, private (individuals), and 
state (public) (Feder & Feeny, 1991; IFAD, 1995; GTZ, 1998; FAO, 2002).
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 Communal: A right of commons, according to which each member has a right 
to independently use the holdings of the community, may exist within a com-
munity (Feder & Feeny, 1991). For example, members of a community may 
have the right to graze cattle on a common pasture. Communal lands also play 
a significant role in the distribution of land and resources among community 
members to supplement their daily needs (Harada, 2005).
 Private: This form of land regime consists of the assignment of rights to a 
private party who may be an individual, a married couple, a group of people, 
or a corporate body such as a commercial entity or non-profit organization. For 
example, individual families may have exclusive rights to residential parcels, 
agricultural parcels, and certain trees within a community. Without the consent 
of those who hold the rights, other members of the community can be excluded 
from using these resources.
 State: Under state property regimes, stewardship of land and natural resources 
is vested in the state. This means the state owns, manages, and is entitled to 
income generated from the resource (IFAD, 1995). Property rights are assigned 
to an authority in the public sector. For example, forestland in some countries 
may fall under the mandate of the state, whether at a central or decentralized 
level of government.
Customary land tenure systems in Nigeria are related to family and inheritance 
systems and are based on the concept of group ownership of absolute rights to 
land. Each member of the group does not possess land rights on an individual 
basis; instead, each member possesses these rights jointly with the other members 
of the community (Fabusoro et al., 2008). Whereas each person has customary 
rights to land, such rights are usually limited only to the use and transfer through 
inheritance or renting. Customary land rights establish the basis for access to land 
resources and the opportunity to use land for productive purposes (Famoriyo, 
1980). Famoriyo (1979) noted that three principles have been observed under the 
customary rules of tenure: 1) each individual member of a landholding family is 
entitled to a portion of land, enough to feed him or herself and the members of 
his or her family; 2) no member of the community can dispossess another of his 
or her stake in family land; and 3) no one can alienate family members’ inter-
ests in family land without the knowledge and consent of those members. Tenure 
systems under customary law vary but, in principle, are restricted to usufruct 
rights. An individual has usufruct rights to the land farmed by his or her lineage 
or in his or her community area. Individuals can possess land as long as they 
use it for the benefit of their family or society, can pass the land on to an heir, 
can pledge its use to satisfy a debt, but cannot sell or mortgage it. The right of 
disposal belongs only to the community, which, acting through traditional author-
ities, exercises this right in accordance with customary law. Land rights may be 
perpetual, for certain limited periods, or solely for the lifetime of the holder 
(Poguchi, 1962). Although titles to land are generally unrecorded, family and 
individual rights are usually well known and accepted within the community 
(Fabiyi & Adegboye, 1977).
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Generally, either through communal, state, or private regimes, rights to land 
differ based on the aforementioned situations. According to Payne (1997) and the 
FAO (2002), land rights can take the following forms:
 Use rights: Rights to use the land for grazing, growing subsistence crops, gath-
ering minor forestry products, and so on. Poor individuals in a community have 
only use rights.
 Access rights: The ease with which communities, households, and individuals 
acquire land for livelihood-related activities and shelter.
 Control rights: The right to make decisions about how the land should be used, 
including deciding which crops should be planted and how to benefit finan-
cially from the sale of crops and so on.
 Transfer rights: The right to sell or mortgage the land, to convey the land to 
others through intra-community reallocations, to transmit the land to heirs 
through inheritance, and to reallocate use and control rights.
These categories serve as the conceptual framework for land rights used in this 
study.
STUDY AREA
This study was conducted in Nigeria, which has a total land area of 923,768 
km2 with varied climate zones. The far south is defined by its tropical rainforest 
climate, where the annual rainfall is 1,520 to 2,030 mm. Approximately 70% of 
the population engages in agricultural production at a subsistence level. The study 
was conducted in Bida (Niger State), Zaria (Kaduna State), Akure (Ondo State), 
Ilorin (Kwara State), Abuja (the Federal Capital Territory—FCT), and Abakaliki 
(Ebonyi State), areas in which sawah rice production technology is being pro-
moted. The specific sites for data collection were Ejeti, Etsusegi, Epagi, Baba, 
Nasarafu, Shabamaliki, Ajakpe, Sheshibikun, and Etundandan in Bida; Nakala and 
Millennium Village Pampaida in Zaria; Aule and Ijare in Akure; Ilota, Idofian, 
Elerinjare, and Ajase-Epo in Ilorin; Wako in Abuja and Abakaliki.
Bida
Bida is located in Niger State in the central part of Nigeria. Bida is the sec-
ond largest city in Niger State, with an estimated population of 178,840 (National 
Population Commission—NPC of Nigeria, 2006); it is located on latitude 9° 06 
N and longitude 6° 01 E and lies 173 m above sea level. Bida is located on dry 
and arid land. The major ethnic group is the Nupe. It is well known for its tra-
ditional crafts, notably brass and copper goblets, other metal products, glass beads 
and bangles, raffia hats and mats, and locally dyed cotton and silk cloth. Bida is 
also known for the production of rice cultivated in the floodplains and the inland 
valley in Niger State; hence the National Cereal Research Institute (NCRI) is 
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located in Bida. Farmers in Bida also produce yams, sorghum, millet, cotton, 
peanuts (groundnuts), sugarcane, and fruits. The fertility of the soil and availabil-
ity of water have made Ejeti, Etsusegi, Epagi, Baba, Nasarafu, Shabamaliki, 
Sheshibikun, and Etundandan more suitable sites for sawah development.
Zaria
Zaria, located in Kaduna State, on latitude 11° 07 N and longitude 7° 43 E is 
a medium-sized city with an estimated population of 547,000 (NPC of Nigeria, 
2006) and a growth rate of 3.5% per annum. The inhabitants of Zaria are primar-
ily members of the Hausa nation. Agriculture is by far the most important activity 
of the working population. Approximately 40–75% of Zaria’s working population 
derive their principal means of livelihood from agriculture. Agricultural activity in 
Zaria can be divided into two types: rain-fed and irrigated farming. Food crops 
grown include guinea corn, rice, maize and millet, and cash crops include cotton, 
groundnuts, and tobacco. Zaria, which has a tropical climate with a mean total 
annual rainfall of approximately 1,100 mm, lies in the natural vegetation zone con-
sisting primarily of woodland known as Northern Guinea Savannah. Soil in Zaria 
mostly belongs to the class of leached, ferruginous tropical soils, with material that 
consists of several feet of deposited silt and sand overlying sedimentary decom-
Fig. 1. Map of Nigeria showing the study area.
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posed rock. In addition to agriculture, the people of Zaria are also employed by 
the textile industry.
Akure
Akure, the capital city of Ondo State, is located on latitude 7° 25 N and lon-
gitude 5° 20 E. The people of Akure belong to Nigeria’s Yoruba ethnic group. It 
has a population of about 500,000 and is characterized by a warm humid tropical 
climate, with an average rainfall of about 1,500 mm per annum. Annual average 
temperatures range between 21.4°C and 31.1°C, and its mean annual relative 
humidity is about 77.1%. The vegetation in this area is of the tropical rainforest 
type. Akure lies on a relatively flat plain within the Western Nigerian plain and 
is about 250 m above sea level. Akure has a relatively dry season from Novem-
ber to March and a rainy season from April to October. Although cocoa is by far 
the most important local commercial crop, cotton, teak, and palm produce are also 
cultivated for export. Arable crops grown include yams, cassava, maize, bananas, 
rice, okra, and pumpkins.
Ilorin
Ilorin, the capital city of Kwara State, is located between latitudes 8° 24 N 
and 8° 36 N and longitudes 4° 10 E and 4° 36 E and occupies an area of about 
100 km2. It is dominated by the Yoruba people from southwestern Nigeria and 
is situated at a strategic point between the densely populated southwestern and 
the sparsely populated middle belt of Nigeria. Ilorin is located in a traditional 
zone between the deciduous woodland of the south and the dry savannah of the 
north of Nigeria. The climate of Ilorin is characterized by both wet and dry sea-
sons. The temperature of Ilorin ranges from 33°C to 34°C from November to 
January and from 34°C to 53°C from February to April. The total annual rainfall 
in the area is about 1,200 mm. The soil is loamy and supports the growth of 
cereal crops. Agricultural crops grown include groundnuts, yams, cassava, guinea-
corn, rice, maize, beans, and vegetables. The availability of lowland with fertile 
soil made Ilota, Idofian, Elerinjare, and Ajase-Epo suitable for the adoption of 
sawah technology.
Abuja
Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), is located between latitudes 8° 25 
N and 9° 25 N of the equator and longitudes 6° 45 E and 7° 45 E. The territory 
covers an area of 8,000 km2 and is bordered by four states: Niger to the West, 
Nassarawa to the East, Kogi to the South, and Kaduna to the North. Abuja has 
a population of 1,405,201 (NPC of Nigeria, 2006). The inhabitants are tradition-
ally members of the Gwari ethnic nationality, but people from all over Nigeria 
now reside in this territory. Migrant farmers from Benue and Kogi are also found 
in the territory. Abuja falls within the Guinean forest-savanna zone of the West 
African sub-region and features a tropical wet and dry climate. A number of local 
soils have been identified within Abuja, and these include alluvial soils, luvisols, 
and entisols. The rainy season begins in April and ends in October, with a rain-
fall of about 1,500 mm during the rainy season. The sawah site in Abuja is located 
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in Wako, a village in Abuja. Wako village is a host community for both the 
indigenous Gwari and the migrant farmers from neighboring Benue and Kogi 
states. The accessibility to the Nigerian seat of power in Abuja, labor from both 
native and migrant farmers, and the perennial water source in Wako made it suit-
able for sawah development.
Abakaliki
Abakaliki is the capital city of Ebonyi State in southeastern Nigeria located on 
latitude 6° 20 N and longitude 8° 06 E. The inhabitants are primarily members 
of the Igbo nation. Abakaliki is made up of three clans: the Ezza Ezekuna, Izzi, 
and Ikwo and has an estimated population of 141,438. Abakaliki, which lies at 
the intersection of Enugu, Afikpo, and Ogoja Roads, is commonly referred to as 
the food basket of southern Nigeria. The city has been a leading producer of rice, 
yams, and cassava for decades. The soil is texturally clay loam with gravelly 
sub-soil in some locations, especially the upland areas adjacent to the lowland 
areas. Abakaliki soil is believed to be among the best for rice production in Nige-
ria, especially for the popular “Abakaliki Rice.” This has attracted partnerships 
among the Abakaliki Rice Farmers Association, the Abakaliki Rice Mill Owners 
Association, the Ebonyi State government, and some international agencies like 
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and United Nations Indus-
trial Development Organization (UNIDO) to improve rice production in the state. 
The rainfall pattern is bimodal, with peaks in the months of July and September. 
Annual rainfall stabilizes around May and stops around October, leaving a dry 
period between November and April.
METHODOLOGY
I. Sampling and Data Analysis
A sample of 124 sawah rice farmers was selected randomly from a list of rice 
farmers farming at the sites. Data used in this study were collected from October 
2009 to January 2011 in all the sawah sites in Nigeria. The availability of inland 
valleys is a prerequisite for the adoption of sawah rice production technology. 
Farmers were selected based on their participation in sawah rice production. Data 
used in this study were collected in all the sites using interview guide. In addi-
tion to the interview guide, discussions were held with randomly selected farmers 
and key informants, including community leaders. These discussions helped to 
provide detailed information, especially about conflicts and conflict management, 
topics perceived as “delicate” by farmers. The nature of the land rental was deter-
mined by whether the tenant farmer was paying money (cash) for the use of the 
land or giving the landlord part of his/her farming proceeds (paddy) in kind or 
both. The amount paid for rent and the quantity of the paddy given to the land-
lord were also recorded. Rights to the land were categorized as the right to use, 
right to control, and right to transfer land. The yield was determined by measur-
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ing the harvested products from the cultivated sawah area in kilograms. Farm size 
was measured in hectares using a Geographic Positioning System instrument (GPS). 
Descriptive statistics were used to analyze the socioeconomic and farming char-
acteristics of farmers. T-test was used to determine significant differences in the 
yields and farm sizes of landlords and tenant farmers. As shown in Table 1, sawah 
rice farmers are predominantly male with average age of 42.3 years; few elderly 
farmers are involved in sawah farming. The majority have Quranic education, and 
are Nupe, a tribal people from north-central Nigeria. The household size of farm-
ers ranged between one and 40, with a mean of 14. These household members 
may serve as source of labor that can be used on the farm. The mean size of 
farms using the sawah system is 0.53 ha; however, the majority of farmers have 
farms consisting of less than 0.5 ha and have a mean income of ₦151,110 
(US$1,042 with an exchange rate of ₦145 to US$1 at the time of data collec-
tion in 2009). The mean number of years of experience with rice production and 
the mean number of years of experience with rice sawah production (adoption of 
sawah system of rice production) were 32 and 6, respectively. Thus, the respon-
dents have accumulated enough experience with rice production to be capable of 
using sawah technology. Additionally, their experience with rice production is of 
great importance when developing the skills required for sawah rice production. 
The mean yield of rice from the sawah fields is 2.5 ton, with a majority of farm-
ers having a yield of less than 2 ton. The yield corresponds with the size of the 
field. The yield of sawah fields among the sawah farmers is 4.65 ton/ha.
Table 1. Socioeconomic characteristics of respondents
Attribute Definition Distribution 
Sex Sex of the respondents
as male or female
Male (98.9%); Female (1.1%)
Age Actual age of respondents Average age = 42.3
Educational level Highest educational
attainment
Quranic (62.7%); Secondary 
(18.10%); Primary (12.0%);     
No formal Education (3.6%); 
Tertiary (3.6%)
Ethnicity Ethnic affiliation Nupe (73.4%); Lada (9.7%); 
Hausa (8.1%); Igbo (7.3%);     
Yoruba (1.6%)
Household size Number of persons
in the household
Average = 14 persons
Yield Yield from the sawah farm Average = 2.5 ton







Number of years spent
in rice farming
Average = 32 years
Years of experience
in sawah rice production
Number of years spent
in Sawah rice farming
Average = 6 years
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
I. Land Rental in Sawah-based Rice Production 
Two main rental arrangements were identified in the study area: (a) land-for-
paddy, and (b) land-for-cash. In the case of land-for-paddy, both landlord and 
tenant agree that the tenant will give some of his yield to the landlord after the 
harvest as rent. In the case of land-for-cash, the tenant pays an agreed amount 
of money to the landlord on an annual basis before using the land. The most 
common arrangement in the study site was land-for-paddy. As shown in Table 2, 
76.1% of rental agreements were under the land-for-paddy system. According to 
this arrangement, the tenant farmer gives 5% of the total rice yield to the landlord. 
As reported by Robertson (1987), high risk, price fluctuations, and the subsistence 
character of non-capitalized agricultural production in Africa are significant and 
important reasons for entering into this type of arrangement. The landlord and ten-
ant share both the benefits and risks involved in the use of the land.
With respect to the land-for-cash system, the average annual rent at the study 
sites was ₦12,000 ha-1year-1 (US$82 ha-1year-1). Rent is based on local knowledge 
of land supply/demand interactions over time and experiences with the produc-
tion cost/return structure among the people. The rent is fixed in advance in the 
form of a verbal agreement between landlord and tenant. This arrangement is 
considered to be mutually beneficial for both landlord and tenant, and the agree-
ment is believed to be fair to both parties. The duration of the agreement ranges 
from 2 to 15 years, and payment is made on an annual basis. As part of the 
agreement, landlords reserve the right to take over the land from the tenants in 
situations of refusal to pay rent, subletting land to other tenants, failure to renew 
the agreement on expiration, non-observance of local customs, and social abuse 
in the community. Special cases occur in which tenants pay the rent in cash 
before using the land and also give part of their yield to the landlords after the 
harvest. However, this arrangement is based on mutual agreement between land-
lord and tenant.
The release of land in the study locations to tenants by landlords is based pre-
dominantly on ethnicity, social status, and relationships. Landlords prefer to give 
land to farmers from the same ethnic group but sometimes will rent to farmers 
Table 2. Land rental in sawah-based rice production





Land-for-cash   2   (4.4) ₦12,000 ha-1 year-1 Verbal Not secured




  9 (19.6) ₦12,000 ha-1 year-1 at the
beginning of year and
5% of total yield on harvest 
Verbal Not secured
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from another ethnic group based on their social relationships and social status. 
According to the respondents, this practice is intended to minimize the occurrence 
of conflicts resulting from rental arrangements. Other factors that contributed to 
the decision between landlord and tenant to enter into tenancy agreements include 
labor supply opportunities, access to resources and inputs, and risk (Lastarria-
Cornhiel & Melmed-Sanjak, 1999).
II. Land Rights for Landlords and Tenants Involved in Sawah-based Rice Production
The land rights system examined in this study does not provide free access to 
the land in the study locations. All lands are designated based on the communal 
system (Table 3) and are allocated to individual owners, who then have use of, 
control over, and transfer rights related to the land (Table 4). Thus, control over 
the land rests solely with the landlords. They decide the size of the land to be 
cultivated by tenants and may prevent tenants from expanding the size of their 
sawah farms. Transfer rights related to the land (from one person or generation 
to another) also rest solely with the landlords, allowing them to rent it out, share 
its usage, leave it fallow, bequeath it, or sell it. However, these land-use decisions 
require consultation with family members who may share inherited ownership of 
the land. This consultation is necessary to avoid conflicts over land use and main-
tain appropriate communal land designations and rights. Table 4 presents a sum-
mary of situations pertaining to land rights at the study sites. Landlords can give 
parcels of his/her land to a tenant only after due consultation with family heads 
and other family members.
This study identified four categories of tenants: (a) farmers with migrant lin-
eage who, irrespective of length of stay in the location, do not have inheritance 




























*Multiple responses provided; ** Land tenure: Some farmers said that they did not inherit the land 
they are using and also do not rent the land. However, they proved that they had been using the 
land for so many years that it cannot be taken from them. Because it was not possible to determine 
the sources of their land, the authors decided to classify their land as owned to distinguish them 
from those who inherited their land.
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rights to community land; (b) farmers whose land was fallow during the crop-
ping season; (c) farmers who have lost their land to land degradation (mainly 
erosion); and (d) farmers without access to lowland suitable for sawah produc-
tion (in this case for rice production). These groups of farmers have similar rights 
to land according to the communal regime. Land tenants have only the right to 
use the land, and restrictions are imposed by landlords, local customs, the cus-
tomary tenure regime, and other social factors. These restrictions have become 
the norms governing land rental at most sites and therefore guide agreements 
between landlords and land tenants.
In most cases, tenants are restricted to growing rice and several arable crops 
on sawah land, whereas the landlord is free to cultivate any crop. The tenant is 
not allowed to transfer land to another tenant and is also prevented from erect-
ing certain structures, such as farmhouses and storehouses for harvested grains, 
on the land. Tenants are restricted from leaving the land fallow and are not allowed 
to grow permanent crops on the land. A limit is also imposed on how the tenant 
can use the land for the grazing of their small ruminants after harvesting their 
rice. The short period of tenancy sometimes prevents tenants from constructing 
structures that are needed to create the sawah plot. Based on observations made 
Table 4. Land rights of landlords and tenants
Rights Landlords Tenant farmers 
Right to use:
•Right to use the land for grazing
•Right to use the land for growing
subsistence crops
•Right to use the land for gathering minor
forestry products
•Right to choose type of farming
•Right to leave the land fallow
No limitations Limited to sawah rice production
Right to control
•Right to make decisions about how the
land should be used
No limitations No right to control land use.
Land can be used only for 
sawah production
Right to transfer
•Right to convey the land to others
through intra-community reallocations
•Right to give out one’s land
•Right to hire out one’s land and to
re-allocate use and control rights
•Right to sell or mortgage the land
Consultation with
family members
No right to transfer
Security of land Secured Not secured
Who makes land-use decisions? Self, in consultation
with family members
Landlord
Accessing lowland and upland areas:
Do the methods for accessing the
lowlands for rice production differ from 
those for accessing the uplands?
Both uplands and
lowlands are accessed 
by inheritance
Both are accessed by rental
but the lowlands now attracts 
more attention and competition 
than does the uplands
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at the study sites, land use among tenants is not secure, and the landlord may 
decide to take over land at anytime so desired.
Since the introduction of the sawah method of rice production and the drastic 
increase in the yield of farmers, the process by which land is accessed for this 
purpose has become more competitive among farmers. Landlords now rent larger 
sawah farming plots in upland than lowland areas. The control exerted by many 
landlords can be a source of conflict and, in many cases, is a source of insecu-
rity for tenants. It also limits the participation of landless people in sawah rice 
production.
III. Land-related Constraints Faced by Tenant Farmers
As shown in Table 5, the major problems faced by tenant farmers in accessing 
land for sawah production are distance to farms, land availability, short duration 
of tenancy periods, acquisition of land, and interference from other landlord farm-
ers. Farmers travel as far as 15 km from their houses in search of suitable sites 
for sawah development due to the nature of land ownership in the study area. For 
this reason Oladele & Wakatsuki (2010) suggested that constraints related to 
wasted time and traveling long distances to rice fields be addressed to make more 
time available for farm work. Most roads leading to farmers’ fields are in a 
deplorable condition, which renders the transport of inputs and yields in and out 
of farms difficult. The period of tenancy and interference from landlords some-
times create problems for tenant farmers who rent land.
Due to the increase in yields from sawah rice fields compared with those fol-
lowing traditional methods, from 1.5 ton/ha (WARDA, 1999) to 4.65 ton/ha based 
on the results of this study, most landlords have resorted to either increasing the 
rent on their land, which has had a considerable effect on tenants, or refusing to 
renew the tenancy (Oladele & Wakatsuki, 2010). The difficulties faced by farm-
ers related to acquiring land for sawah have become associated with the use of 
sawah technology. Additionally, farmers have cited ineffective governmental pol-
icies on land as a constraint. The 1978 Land Use Decree in Nigeria, instead of 
solving farmers’ problems, has compounded the stress they experience as they try 
 Table 5. Land-related constraints and severity of constraints
Constraints Very severe (%)* Severe (%) Somewhat severe (%)
Accessibility problems due to
long walking distance
31.9 20.2 47.9
Scarcity of sawah plots 21.0 20.2 58.8
Disputes and conflicts 0.0 0.0 100.0
Tenancy payments 0.0 0.0 100.0
Duration of tenancy 0.0 6.7 93.3
Interference from landlords 8.4 0.0 91.6
Ineffective government policies 0.0 0.8 99.2
*Likert Scale: Very severe = 3; Severe = 2; Somewhat severe = 1. The Likert scale is a scale used 
for the assessment of the severity of the constraints.
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to secure land for agriculture. Indeed, today less land is available to the ordinary 
Nigerian than it was during the period prior to the Decree, thus rendering most 
citizens to a state of perpetual tenancy (Olayiwola & Adeleye, 2006).
IV. Conflict Management in Landlord-Tenant Relationships in the Context of Sawah 
Development
A qualitative survey of conflict-management approaches was conducted at the 
sawah sites. Case studies of the nature of conflicts, causes of conflicts, and 
conflict-resolution methods adopted are discussed in this section with the aim 
of studying the present to prepare for the future of sawah development in Nige-
ria. 
As shown in Table 6, land conflicts were recorded in the Ilorin, Bida, and 
Abuja sawah sites. The conflicts involved inter-communal (involving villages) and 
landlord-tenant disputes over the land used for sawah rice production. Conflicts 
among the parties involved were caused by the lack of proper demarcation between 
communities (villages) and landlords’ attempts to enforce their land rights on their 
tenants. In Kwara State, two villages, A and E, (1) share a common boundary with 
a large expanse of lowland. A parcel of land given to a tenant by a landlord in vil-
lage A for sawah cultivation in the 2008 cropping season led to an inter-communal 
conflict. Villages A and E both claimed ownership of the land. As this persisted, 
the tenant farmer was not allowed to farm the land. Efforts to settle the matter 
proved unsuccessful. Hence, the land was left uncultivated for two seasons, 2008 
and 2009, after the initial investment by the farmer in bund construction, canal 
construction, and farm layout. A similar inter-communal type of conflict occurred 
between villages M and J in Bida, Niger State, where native farmers from the 
villages claimed ownership and control over a parcel of land suitable for sawah 
rice production. The competing claims of land ownership led to a conflict between 
the two neighboring villages. Due to this conflict, no farmer was allowed to use 
the land. In village B of the Federal Capital Territory in Abuja, the land conflict 
involved the landlord and tenant. The conflict erupted when the landlord farmer 
decided to take over the land because the tenant obtained a higher yield from 
the sawah plot. Because the period of tenancy had not expired, the refusal of the 
tenant to vacate the land led to conflict between the two parties.




Form of conflict Causes of conflict
Management
and resolution
Akure No None None None
Ilorin Yes Inter-communal Land demarcation Dialogue
Bida Yes Inter-communal Land demarcation Litigation
Zaria No None None None
Abakaliki No None None None
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Attempts to resolve these conflicts by communities have involved dialogue, liti-
gation, and mediation through a third party. Mediation is a voluntary, negotiation-
based process in which the parties involved in a current or potential dispute meet 
with the assistance of a neutral and impartial mediator for collaborative problem 
solving and consensus building with the goal of achieving a mutually acceptable 
resolution (Andrew, 2003). As a result of dialogue, the conflict at villages A and 
E was resolved with the intervention of the Ilorin sawah management team, who 
operated with the assistance of the village extension agents and the traditional rul-
ers of the villages. Participation of the involved parties in the two villages was 
sought, and the conflict was resolved amicably. Both communities agreed that the 
farmer should be allowed to use the land for sawah rice cultivation. It must be 
noted, however, that the land ownership had not yet been determined at the time 
of data collection. In the case of village B, the intervention of traditional leaders 
assisted in resolving the conflict. After the intervention, the landlord farmer will-
ingly released the land to the tenant. In the case of villages M and J in Bida, the 
parties employed police litigation and the conflict had yet been resolved at the time 
of data collection. Ownership of the land will be determined by the law court.
Based on our observations, it appears that the dispute settlements imposed on 
parties or negotiated within the shadow of the law can elongate the conflict period 
and may not eliminate the real sources of the dispute. This process of conflict 
resolution may actually disrupt relationships rather than solve problems. Disputes 
are resolved only when the parties themselves reach what they consider to be an 
acceptable resolution and the settlement of issues is based on a consensus among 
all parties. Conflicts over land may contribute to decreased agricultural production 
and land insecurity. Deininger & Castagnini (2006) have shown that the outputs 
of plots affected by conflicts are clearly lower than are those of plots not affected 
by conflicts. Land conflicts are the most evident social manifestations of land inse-
curity (Idowu, 2006), and land insecurity is a major contributing factor to extreme 
poverty and social instability, including conflicts and civil unrest, rural migration, 
land abandonment, and poor economic growth (FAO, 2002). The estimated mag-
nitude of productivity losses due to land conflict, between 5% and 11%, is very 
large, albeit consistent with descriptive evidence that points to a number of ways 
in which land conflicts lead to highly disruptive economic consequences (Deininger 
& Castagnini, 2006).
V. Significant Differences in the Yields and Farm Sizes of Landlord and Tenant Farmers
We found a significant difference (t = 3.424) in the farm sizes of landlords 
and tenants (Table 7 and Fig. 2), implying that land rights determine the farm 
size at sawah sites in this country. This result further implies that the access of 
tenants to land is not equal to that of landlords. The kind of rights and tenure 
possessed by an individual determines control over land, including the amount of 
the land that can be used for agricultural production. This, in turn, can produce 
disparities in agricultural income. Jayne et al. (2003) found serious disparities in 
income and land allocation in five countries in Africa. Their research found that 
25% of rural agricultural households in Ethiopia, Rwanda, Kenya, Mozambique, 
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and Zambia were virtually landless, having access to 0.1 ha per capita or less in 
each country. This situation could also affect the adoption of sawah technology 
in Nigeria.
Additional results show significant differences (t = 3.167) in the yields of land-
lords and tenants. Although the implications of this were not subjected to further 
econometric tests, the preliminary interpretation is that landlords have a signifi-
cant influence that grants them access to certain important information that can 
be useful in improving production practices. The opportunity to control land also 
places landowners at an advantage in terms of receiving regular advice from agri-
cultural extension officers. Land can be used as social capital and can constitute 
an economic advantage in agricultural production. The security of tenure can also 
provide sufficient insurance against farm-related risks, which, in turn, are related 
to increased investment in farms over the medium- and long-terms. Sawah devel-
opment involves the construction of structures such as bunds, canals, and dykes, 
which require land with secure tenure (either permanent or for a reasonable num-
ber of years) for the farmers to break even on the investment.
Hayes et al. (1997) reported that within the customary tenure system, more 
individualized rights are associated with a higher propensity to make investments; 
this, in turn, had a positive effect on yield. Lack of security with regard to land 
as a result of renting hinders tenants from investing in such structures and leads 
to reductions in the yields from sawah farms. The lack of secure ownership rights 
to land reduces farmers’ incentives to invest in yield-increasing inputs and to put 
land to its most productive use (Johnson, 1972; Besley, 1995; Hayes et al., 1997; 
Feder et al., 1988; Roth & Dwight, 1998). A study conducted in Thailand also 
showed that secured lands are characterized by higher investment demand and 
input intensity and, as a result, yield was higher on secured lands than on lands 
without titles (Feder et al., 1988). Place & Hazell (1993) reported that parcels of 
secured land have received more drainage or liming improvements than those 
with no secured rights; they noted that these improvements increase farm output. 
In Niger, Gavian & Fafchamps (1996) reported that tenure insecurity stimulates 
farmers to divert the scarce manure resources used for improving farm yields 
from less secure or borrowed land to more secure or owned land whenever they 
can. A study of the effects of land tenure on the production behavior of farmers 
in rural China conducted by Li et al. (1998) showed that the right to use land 
for long (or indefinite) periods of time encourages the use of land-saving invest-
ments such as organic manure, but that the use of short-term inputs was not 
affected by such rights.
Table 7. Difference in the yields and farm sizes of landlord and tenant farmers
Variables Landlord farmers (N = 89) Tenant farmers (N = 46) t-value
Farm size (ha)* 41.50 15.84 3.424
Yield (kg)* 216,680 69,560 3.167
*significant at P < 0.05.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The land rights of landlord and tenant farmers in sawah sites in Nigeria are 
characterized by disparities between the two parties. The rights and control over 
land by tenants are limited and constrain attempts to improve production and 
invest in farms. Access to and control over land also places landowners at an 
advantage in the adoption of any technology. As sawah technology promises higher 
yields for rice farmers in Nigeria, it also requires substantial investment in the 
construction of canals, bunds, and dykes, which only the landlords have the right 
to do. This calls for an institutional approach to ensuring more secure rights and 
longer tenancies on land for tenants, which would allow for growth and invest-
ment in the land. Access to land for tenants will enhance their participation in 
sawah and increase their chances of increasing their income and emerging from 
poverty. Investment in more durable inputs such as power tillers, dykes, and irri-
gation canals will decrease if land is not secured. Therefore, tenants and landless 
people need more secure access to land to provide them with opportunities to 
manage their sawah plots so that they will have higher yields. Farmers whose 
land security is not guaranteed would be more inclined towards short-term invest-
ments in land, and the sustainability of sawah would not be expected to be their 
priority. More social capital is also needed because the land rights and the rental 
system at the study sites are entrenched in the communal tenure arrangement. 
Expanding the sphere of social capital between the landless and the landowners 
could ensure productive negotiations and create effective communication. This 
will also help to reduce conflict.
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Fig. 2. Size of farms at sawah sites.
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NOTES
(1) A, E, M, J, and B are not the real names; given the sensitive nature of land conflicts and 
the possibility that further research will be conducted in these villages, the authors de-
cided to use letters in place of names.
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